

16 April 1968

Summary of Positions Taken on the CIA Draft Presentations
of Enemy Strengths in South Vietnam

General

All parties agree that the final report should carefully describe trends in quality as well as quantity. They also agree that the relative quality of all elements should be clearly described. The CIA report will satisfy these requirements, but the other participants will eventually have an opportunity to see and comment on the format and language of the report as well as the numbers contained in it.

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Main and Local Forces



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
CIA: Original proposal was to add on an additional 21,000 to 27,000 for: (a) small units (10,000-11,000); (b) those on TDY (6,000); and (c) unlisted division support (5,000-10,000). In the interests of reaching agreement, CIA would have dropped (b) and cut (a) to 5,000. This would have cut the 21,000-27,000 to 10,000-15,000. Because no satisfactory agreement could be reached, CIA reserves the right to re-examine its position.



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NOTE: It was suggested that MACV flag Washington when it goes to JGS with a change. This would cut some of the time lag problem regardless of sources of information.

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
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
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Administrative Services

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


CIA: Stands by its original estimate of 75,000-100,000, with the note that CIA and DIA agree that there are about 10,000 to 20,000 of these troops as defined serving outside South Vietnam in border areas.



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Guerrillas

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CIA stands with its estimate of 110,000-120,000 for that date and will distinguish as between a village/full time and hamlet/part time concept. These are 30,000-40,000 and 80,000-90,000, respectively. It will also be noted that secret guerrillas are included.

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NOTE: No discussion of guerrilla strengths since the first of the year took place.

Political

All parties agree to use the MACV estimate of 80,000-90,000 (85,000) defined as professional cadre. In addition, all parties agree that there are additional full time personnel who serve the professional staffs.

MACV, CINCPAC, and DIA do not wish to quantify this latter group.

CIA, NSA, and State believe that an order of magnitude for this category should be indicated, because, otherwise, readers may think this number to be significantly higher than it is. We have in mind here our discussion of what a bureaucratic pyramid looks like. CIA is considering a number like 20,000-30,000 widened to 10,000-30,000 to indicate the softness of the estimate.

CIA (NSA and State?) will accept MACV's view of recent attrition of the infrastructure at district and province levels.

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
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Assault Youth and Self Defense

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


CIA, NSA, and State believe the two categories should be listed separately.



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